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1. INTRODUCTION 
Game theory is an important field in economics; it studies how 
people make decisions amid conflict and cooperation. Various 
experiments have been carried to study the way people play those 
games, and economists study those data for various purposes. 
There has been a rise of need for using artificial agents to simulate 
the game, since we could save the cost of hiring human subjects 
for the experiments, and we could gain more control over the 
experiment settings. 
We are focusing on a particular field in game theory called 
Bayesian game, or game with incomplete information. In this kind 
of game the players have only part of the information, such as the 
payoff they receive when they make a move. In order to play well 
in this kind of game, players need to conjecture the structure of 
the game and make inferences about the actions and thoughts of 
the other players. 
We gather data from the Market Entry Prediction Contest. They 
have carried a market entry game experiment in Harvard 
University; it is a 4-person repeated game with different parameter 
sets for different games. 120 people are divided into 30 4-person 
subgroups, and those subgroups will play 10 games; each game 
has 50 repeated trials or rounds. The players only have 
information about the obtained payoff, which is the payoff they 
receive, and the forgone payoff, which is the payoff they would 
have received if they had chosen the other strategy. They do not 
know the actions and payoffs of the other players, and they are 
unaware of the payoff matrix, or any structures of the game 
mechanisms.  
Various models have been proposed to build the artificial agent 
for this game, such as Reinforcement Learning (RL), Fictitious 
Play (FL), Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) [4] [5], and 
the Inertia, Weighting, and Sampling (I-SAW) model [6]. There 
has been a contest for new models that can make decent 
predictions on the real data; contestants are given the estimation 
data set and are tested on the competition data set. Since the study 
is related different fields such as machine learning, economics, 
psychology, and neuroscience, The best model seems to take into 
consideration all of these fields, and combine the findings to 
simulate the process of playing the game. The objective of this 
research is to study various effects in the market entry game, and 
improve upon existing models on the prediction of the entry rate. 
 
2. BOUNDED RATIONALITY, MEMORY, 
DEVIATION FROM THEORY 
There are a lot of noises or variations in the environment when we 
conduct economics experiment in real life, and the result deviate 
from the predictions of theories. It has been found that differences 
in the experimental environment can play a huge role in the result 
[1]. We need to account for those various factors that are affecting 
the result of the experiments, make appropriate assumptions, and 
adjust our theories accordingly. 
One finding of the market entry game is that there are more entries 
than predicted by Nash Equilibrium [2]. This excess entry 
suggests that human beings are not very rational in the market 
entry games. Studies on other market entry games also have 
similar findings [4]. Some modification of the models is required 
to take into consideration the bounded rationality and intelligence 
of human beings. We could discount the effect of learning, make 
the attraction lower for all in EWA, or add a random factor such 
as a discount factor on the equation to calculate the probability for 
each strategy. 
We need to account for the heterogeneity of players. They have 
different preferences, rationality, intelligence, learning abilities, 
willingness to play well, incentives, and engagement level with 
the game. We also need to account for the small population of 
people just play randomly. If possible, we should also account for 
different behaviors in repeated games in game theory, such 
as reputation building, strategic teaching, and cooperation. We 
need to build models that can fit with QRE (Quantal Response 
Equilibrium), which allows human players to make mistakes 
during games. 
In particular, we want to study the effect of bounded memory, 
which states that human beings could only remember a certain 
amount of information. Most of the proposed the models assume 
the players have perfect memories; in reality, the players would 
not be able to remember everything from previous rounds. 
 
3. RECENCY EFFECT 
It is an essentially a reinforcement learning problem, where the 
player is trying to learn about the world. The player is sometimes 
in exploration mode, and sometimes in exploitation mode, which 
means he sometimes tries to learn as much as he can, and 
sometimes he wants to use what he has learnt to get a better 
reward. Therefore the player is not stationary, he has different 
motives at different times. We want to examine how does the 
player change his behaviors throughout the game. Specifically, we 
are interested in the recency effect, and how it is changing during 
a game. 
Recency effect states that the most recent round is most important 
for the player; all the other rounds are roughly equally important 
[7]. We could examine the effect of recency by adding it to each 
of the time period and study if there are differences among those 
time periods. 
 
4. IMPLEMENTAION 
We implemented the simulation in Java. Various classes are 
created for various models. I made a class to integrate the recency 
and limited memory effects into the EWA model. 
We use the self-tuning EWA model to make various 
improvements, since it has less free parameters to tune that raw 
EWA, it is a good combination of FL and FP, and unlike I-SAW, 
which takes into consideration many specific things of this market 
entry game, it is more generalized and have more room to 
improve. I-SAW might have the danger of over-fitting, since it 
has so many free parameters to tune. 
We will use the official measuring criteria from the Market Entry 
Prediction Contest, which include three categories: entry rate, 
efficiency, and alternation. Entry rate is the proportion of time the 
players choose the option of entering in one round on average; 
efficiency is the average payoff in one round the players have 
gained; alternation is the proportion of time the players switch 
strategies in one round on average. Here we are mainly looking at 
the entry rate. Mean Squared Deviation (MSD) is used to measure 
the difference between the prediction of the simulations from the 
artificial agents and the actual data done by the human subjects. 
We want to isolate a single effect, observe that effect in the 
context of a smaller period of time, and attempt to find how the 
effect changes over the course of a repeated game. In particular, 
we examine if there is a period in which the player is most 
sensitive to the most recent payoffs or when the recency and 
limited memory effect is strongest, and if there is a period in 
which it is more beneficial for the player to start from scratch by 
ignoring previous experiences. 
We attempt to divide the game of 50 trials into 10 periods of 5 
trials and examine the effect in each period. Some pattern is found 
and further division is desired, so we divide the game into 50 time 
blocks and the recency and limited memory effect on each.  
 
5. EXPERIMENT 1 
We run 50 tests to study the effect of recency and limited memory. 
For each test we run 10-fold cross-validation on the 40 games; we 
run each game 2000 times and take the average of the results. For 
each of the test we study the effect of recency and limited memory 
on a particular trial, starting from trial 0 and ends with trial 49; at 
that trial the artificial agent forget about his experience from 
previous rounds and only look at the result of the most recent 
obtained and foregone payoff. If the obtained payoff is higher 
than the foregone payoff, then keep the current strategy, otherwise 
switch to the other strategy. In other words, at that trial the 
artificial agent will play the game from scratch. 
After conducting those experiments it is found that the recency 
and limited memory effect is strongest at the mid-range of the 
game. Possible explanation is that the player is in exploration 
mode at the beginning, so will be very sensitive to the differences 
in the obtained payoff and forgone payoff, they cannot afford to 
forget the previous experiences, and the recency effect is weak; 
near the end of the game the player might be reluctant to learn 
new information, thus reply heavily on the previous experiences, 
making the recency effect low. 
 
 
Figure 1: The prediction on the average entry rate on the 
competition set against the round at which there is a memory 
reset. 
 
6. EXPERIMENT II 
We attempt to form a new model that is a integration of the 
recency and limited memory effect into the EWA model. We keep 
the logic response of the EWA model when calculating the 
probability for each strategy, and maintain its structure of 
updating the attraction. However, we will add recency and limited 
memory effect with some probability at some trials, based on the 
pattern found from the previous experiments. Various experiments 
are conducted, each with a different set of trials in which recency 
and limited memory effect take place, and each with different 
settings of other parameters, such as the probability of having this 
effect on that round. Various considerations such as the effect of 
loss aversion are also made to see they will make a difference on 
the performance. Again, for each test we run 10-fold cross-
validation on the 40 games, and we run each game 2000 times. 
It is found that a recency model with probability of 40% from trial 
5 to 20, and from trial 25 to 40 have the best performance on the 
estimation set. Further experiment on the competition set also 
shows that it is doing well in predicting the entry rate, as shown 
on Figure 2. Although it is not doing well on the prediction of 
efficiency and alternation, it outperforms the current best model 
(I-SAW) on the prediction of entry rate. In other words, when we 
only want to focus on the entry rate, this hybrid model does the 
best job in predicting that. It also is fast to compute, with only two 
parameters to tune. 
 
 
Figure 2: The prediction on the average entry rate on the 
competition set of different models. The hybrid model is 
labeled as “EWA+Recency” on the graph. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
There are various factors affecting the Market Entry game that are 
not considered by the current models. The effects of recency, 
bounded rationality and limited memory are tested and verified 
through various experiments done using artificial agents built in 
Java. It is found that better prediction of the market entry rate 
could be achieved using an artificial agent that runs on a modified 
version of the EWA model that takes into account the effect of 
recency and limited memory. For future work, additional effects 
could be considered and modification of the current models could 
be made. We could also look how the effect of recency and 
limited memory could be applied to other games.  
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